Swaying to the Extreme: Group Relative Deprivation Predicts Voting for an Extreme Right Party in the French Presidential Election by Urbanska, K. & Guimond, S.
This is a repository copy of Swaying to the Extreme: Group Relative Deprivation Predicts 
Voting for an Extreme Right Party in the French Presidential Election.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/145906/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Urbanska, K. orcid.org/0000-0001-5063-4747 and Guimond, S. (2018) Swaying to the 
Extreme: Group Relative Deprivation Predicts Voting for an Extreme Right Party in the 
French Presidential Election. International Review of Social Psychology, 31 (1). 26. ISSN 
2119-4130 
https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.201
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
There are some [immigrants] who are good, but 
then there are others. And now they have more 
rights than we do.
Marine Le Pen, Marseille rally 19 April 2017
In 2017, Marine Le Pen, the extreme right (ER) leader of the 
Front National (FN) was standing a chance of becoming 
Frances next president. In recent years, the ER  political 
ideology (also referred to as radical right and far right in 
the literature) has re-emerged in the political scene of 
Western Europe and raised serious concerns (Rydgren, 
2007). For example, in the second round of French presi-
dential election in 2002, the FN candidate has received 
17.8% of the vote, while in 2017, this share increased 
to 33.9%. Despite a growing amount of research, a full 
understanding of why people would vote for the ER par-
ties, especially if they may not normally support them, is 
lacking. The literature tends to focus on prejudice towards 
immigrants as the key variable predicting the ER vote, in 
other words, the argument is that those parties appeal 
others through their anti-immigration rhetoric with 
the focus on the immigrant threat (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 
2015; Cutts, Ford & Goodwin, 2011; Green et al., 2016). 
Using a large representative sample, the current research 
adds to this literature and tests for the first time whether 
higher group relative deprivation (GRD), a perception that 
French people are worse off in comparison to immigrants, 
can predict the intention to vote for an ER candidate in 
France. Importantly, we argue that feelings of relative dep-
rivation may sway voters towards an ER candidate even if 
voters may not usually vote for them or feel close to them. 
This may be critical in contexts whereby there are only 
two candidates to choose from, such as second rounds of 
presidential elections.
Relative deprivation theory
People do not make judgements of fairness in absolute 
terms in the social context but primarily by compar-
ing how they are treated and what they are entitled to 
in  comparison to other people or groups (Crosby, 1976). 
This principle has served as the basis for the  development 
of relative deprivation theory, from early work on the 
American soldier (Stouffer et al., 1949) up to present-day 
research on prejudice, intergroup relations and  political 
mobilisation (Mummendey et al., 1999; Osborne & 
 Sibley, 2013; Pettigrew, 2016). Importantly, the principle 
of comparison can take place either at the interpersonal 
level or at the intergroup level (Runciman, 1966). Thus, 
 individuals can experience individual relative deprivation 
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Swaying to the Extreme: Group Relative Deprivation 
Predicts Voting for an Extreme Right Party in the 
French Presidential Election
Karolina Urbanska and Serge Guimond
Why do people vote for the extreme right (ER)? Despite considerable evidence suggesting the role of 
group relative deprivation (GRD) in accounting for prejudice, collective action and support for protest 
movements, there is surprisingly little research that has tested the impact of various types of  relative 
deprivation in explaining the support for the ER. Using a large and representative sample of the French 
population tested before the 2012 presidential election, we hypothesised and found that GRD is a 
 better predictor of the intention to vote for Marine Le Pen, the ER candidate, than individual relative 
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dominance orientation and prejudice, while it did not predict self-placement on the left-right political 
continuum. Thus, the sense that the French as a group are unjustly treated compared to immigrants  living 
in France underpins the vote for the ER but not, as we demonstrate, for any other populist party. We 
discuss how the rhetoric of the ER parties can appeal to voters and expand their base over and above the 
support coming from those who are overtly prejudiced. Data and supplementary materials [DOI: https://
doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/C3K9Y].
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(IRD) when self is perceived to be worse off in relation to 
others, or group relative deprivation (GRD) when ones 
own group is perceived to be less fortunate than another 
group. Therefore, a typical measurement of IRD involves 
people thinking about their personal situation in compar-
ison to that of other people like them, whereas for GRD, 
it involves comparing the ingroup to some other target 
outgroup and indicating the extent to which they judge 
their situation to be better or worse off (see Abrams & 
Grant, 2012;  Pettigrew et al., 2008). Previous research has 
examined how various types of relative deprivation corre-
late with each other, and with relevant outcome variables 
(see  Dambrun & Guimond, 2001). Both types of relative 
deprivation predict a range of personal and behavioural 
responses (Abrams & Grant, 2012; Hafer & Olson, 1993; 
Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Smith & Spears, 1996; Walker & 
Mann, 1987). Higher IRD is associated with poorer indi-
vidual-level outcomes such as academic achievement or 
psychological stress (Smith at al., 2012). The GRD, on the 
other hand, is a particularly robust and relevant concept in 
the explanation of collective responses (Abrams & Grant, 
2012; Grant, 2008; Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Walker & 
Mann, 1987) and intergroup attitudes (Dubé & Guimond, 
1986; Guimond & Dambrun, 2002; Pettigrew et al., 2008). 
A study utilising three representative European data sets 
showed that GRD and not IRD predicts anti-immigrant 
prejudice, even when controlling for more distal predic-
tors of prejudice such as education or age (Pettigrew et al., 
2008). Thus, the finding that perceiving ones own group 
as being worse off than another group can motivate forms 
of prejudice is well established (for a recent review, see 
Anier, Guimond & Dambrun, 2016).
Linking GRD to political behaviours, Abrams and Grant 
(2012) found that GRD and not IRD predicted intention to 
vote for the separatist Scottish National Party by empow-
ering people to believe that social change is possible (see 
also Grant, Bennett & Abrams, 2017). Specifically, it was 
the affective reaction to an unjust treatment of Scottish 
people in comparison to English people that was respon-
sible for the desire to split from the UK. IRD, on the 
other hand, had no impact on political change beliefs. 
Similarly, Marchlewska et al. (2018) manipulated the 
long-term group-level disadvantage, assuming it evoked 
GRD, and found that it was responsible for higher like-
lihood of  voting for Brexit in the UK sample (Study 2), 
whereas  self-report GRD in the US was associated with 
a  willingness to vote for Trump over Clinton in the most 
recent presidential elections (Study 3; see also Pettigrew, 
2017). It appears then that feeling deprived in relation to 
some other groups may motivate individuals to support 
parties that address these feelings of deprivation in their 
political rhetoric. Thus, the major hypothesis put forward 
in the present research is that GRD better predicts voting 
for the extreme-right wing than IRD.
There is surprisingly little research that directly bears on 
this hypothesis. Of course, voting for Trump over Clinton 
or supporting the Brexit cannot be easily equated with vot-
ing for the ER. Trump was a candidate of the Republican 
party which has never been historically a party endorsing 
explicitly an extreme-right wing ideology such as the FN 
in France (Mayer & Perrineau, 1996). Similarly, although 
the campaign for the Brexit was supported by some ER 
leaders such as Nigel Farage, it was also strongly led by 
some members of the Conservative Party who are not usu-
ally considered to be a party of ER. Despite the increas-
ing interest for the concept of populism and the tendency 
among some to equate populism with the ER, there is little 
evidence in support of such an equation (Van Assche et al., 
2018). In fact, among 30 most salient populist parties in 
Europe, only 14 parties (equal to 42%) are further classed 
as ER (Polk et al., 2017). Populism, the idea that govern-
ments are elitist and not serving their citizens rightly, can 
be found on the ER but also on the extreme left (De Cleen, 
Glynos & Mondon, 2018). For example, in France, FN 
can be considered as both populist and ER while parties 
such as Parti de Gauche (PG), at the time led by Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon, can be classified as both populist but on also 
on the left of the political spectrum (see Figure S1 in the 
supplementary materials; https://osf.io/c3k9y/).
Voting for the ER
Issues surrounding immigration and rejection of cultural 
diversity play a central role in the ER party programmes 
(Rydgren, 2007, 2008), unlike left-wing populist move-
ments. The French FN policy, for example, calls for 
national preference in housing, employment, and state 
benefits to those who are of French citizenship. In this 
way, FNs policy encourages preference to the French citi-
zens above the non-citizens. Within the French  political 
landscape, the FN has a long history of being associated 
with and seen as a party of the extreme right (Mayer, 
2017).
The link between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting 
for the ER parties is probably one of the most well-estab-
lished findings in the literature. Decades of research in 
France have shown that authoritarian views, characterised 
by support for conventional values, social stability and sub-
mission to authority, and unfavourable attitudes towards 
immigrants predict support for FN (Lubbers & Scheepers, 
2002; Mayer, 2017; Mayer & Perrineau, 1992). Similar 
findings were obtained in the United Kingdom (Cutts 
et al., 2011), Switzerland (Green et al., 2016) and Austria 
(Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016). However, independently 
of the impact of authoritarian tendencies (Meloen, van 
der Linden & de Witte, 1996), Cornelis and Van Hiel (2015) 
have argued that support for the ER may also reflect a 
strong desire to dominate other groups or social domi-
nance orientation (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Using 
the data from the European Social Survey conducted in 
seven European countries in 2002, they found support 
for a model suggesting that SDO has an indirect effect on 
voting for the ER, mediated by anti-immigrant prejudice 
(see also Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). This was a remark-
able finding given the established role of authoritarianism 
in ER research. Since then, the relationship between SDO 
and voting for the ER has been further supported (Van 
Assche et al., 2018). Thus, ER parties may increase their 
vote by incorporating an anti-immigrant rhetoric which 
stems from wider systemic beliefs about the places of the 
group in the society, which in turn promotes the ER vote. 
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However, little is known about whether GRD represents 
an additional process potentially contributing the explain 
voting for the extreme right.
As intergroup relations (us versus the immigrants) 
are central to the politics of the ER parties, social com-
parisons are embedded in this context, in part, to make 
a positive distinction for own group (Tajfel et al., 1971). 
These comparisons may ultimately lead to feelings of rela-
tive deprivation, whereby people feel that they are worse 
off in contrast to some other individuals or groups. The 
rhetoric regarding the threat that immigrants pose to the 
economy is another thread running through the ER party 
promises, despite little evidence that indicators such as 
unemployment objectively contribute to the rise in the 
ER support (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001, 2002). Thus, ER 
politicians portray immigrants as the cause of the declin-
ing economy at the cost of the national citizens. It is for 
this reason  specifically that higher levels of GRD, a feeling 
that the immigrants may be better off than the national 
ingroup, may predict the likelihood of voting for the 
ER. In fact, higher levels of gross domestic product are 
often  associated with a higher ER preference (Lucassen & 
Lubbers, 2012, see also Mols & Jetten, 2016). Thus, citizens 
of more prosperous countries and regions are more (and 
not less) likely to breed support for ER candidates, show-
ing that objective economic perceptions cannot explain 
an appeal of the ER.
Indeed, across Europe, electoral support for ER appears 
to be higher in countries that are doing well economically 
whereas ER is still marginal in countries that were hit the 
most by the economic crisis (e.g., Spain and Portugal, Zick, 
Küpper & Hövermann, 2011). However, while ER voters 
tend to live in countries that are objectively doing fairly 
well economically, subjective perceptions of economy 
should also be considered. Following the first round of 
the presidential election in Austria, one voter of the ER 
Freedom Party of Austria said: Everything is given to 
them, whereas me, in the meantime, I have to struggle 
with 1300 a month. It has been 30 years that I work like 
crazy and get insulted in underground tunnels by foreign-
ers (Gauquelin, 2016). This voters sentiment appears to 
point to not only relative deprivation, but it also captures 
both the pessimism and the economic struggle at indi-
vidual level. Therefore, while IRD may not be expected to 
explain political behaviour, other negative perceptions 
of the economic prosperity could perhaps better explain 
why people may be attracted to vote for an ER candidate.
The present study
Collectively, the literature is in favour of the relevance of 
anti-immigrant prejudice in the ER vote. Moreover, GRD 
is known to be linked to anti-immigrant prejudice and to 
a range of politically oriented behaviours but has never 
been tested as a distinct predictor of voting intentions for 
the extreme right in national elections. Research investi-
gating the specific voting intentions for nationalist and 
populist movements suggests that GRD is important in 
those contexts, but these are not always ER movements in 
their nature, which limits their comparability. Moreover, 
studies investigating the support for ER typically look at 
the party support or vote in the context of parties from 
the entire political continuum. The present study extends 
on this work by considering the role of GRD in the vote 
for an ER candidate, Marine Le Pen, in France. Like many 
other European countries, France employs a two-round 
system whereby in the second round, people are asked 
to vote for one of the two candidates who received the 
highest share of votes in the first round. This means that 
citizens may be asked to cast a vote for someone who may 
not be their first preference. It is important, therefore, to 
investigate what would encourage individuals to vote for 
the ER candidate over a representative from another party.
By operationalising the intention to vote for ER as 
relative to willingness to vote for another mainstream 
 candidate in this setting, therefore, may be of higher valid-
ity than the traditional party support or the self-placement 
on the left-right political continuum measures. Although 
the choice between only two candidates is often studied 
in the US context, whereby most of voters support either a 
Republican or a Democrat candidate, it is rather different 
from the European politics where there is a wide range 
of political parties representing multiple positions from 
extreme left to extreme right to choose from. In European 
politics, research rarely focuses on the outcomes of a 
two-round system. The present research addresses this 
shortcoming.
In terms of our goals, the present research sought sup-
port for the hypothesis that GRD and not IRD predicts 
vote for the ER candidate. We also tested the extent to 
which GRD, but not IRD, may uniquely predict voting 
for the ER candidate independently of the effects of anti-
immigrant prejudice and SDO (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015). 
Given that theoretically and empirically, GRD is geared 
toward the action mode (Abrams & Grant, 2012; van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), a direct link between 
GRD and the ER voting intentions would be expected. We 
hypothesised that a higher GRD would be related to a 
higher likelihood to vote for an ER candidate, even when 
controlling for other established predictors of ER support 
such as anti-immigrant prejudice and SDO. Moreover, we 
sought to determine the extent to which the role of GRD 
may be specific to a given political action, such as casting 
a vote for the ER, and may not necessarily extend to more 
 general self-placement on the left-right political contin-
uum. Finally, given the potential importance of an array 
of economic perceptions in motivating the ER vote, we 
aimed to explore the effects of a range of economic per-
ceptions, involving comparisons with the present and the 
future, on the likelihood to vote for the ER. While based 
on the previous research we assumed that these economic 
perceptions may be related to the ER vote, we had no a 
priori hypotheses regarding these analyses.
Methods
Participants and procedures
The data in this study was collected by the French TNS 
Sofres polling agency using computer-assisted telephone 
interview method (see Bassili & Fletcher, 1991 for method 
description).1 The survey was conducted in February 
2011, several months before the 2012 French  presidential 
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 elections. The total sample (N = 1001) consisted of 52.3% 
of females and 47.7% of males aged between 18 and 89 
(M = 48.25, SD = 17.60) and was selected based on demo-
graphics to ensure the representativeness of French pop-
ulation. In terms of education, the sample consisted of 
36.4% of people with no education or primary education 
only, 23.2% who have reached secondary level education, 
15.4% with a university degree and 24.1% with a graduate 
or a professional degree (0.9% undeclared). Participants 
also declared their net monthly salary with 11.3% earn-
ing less than 1000, 14.5% earning between 1000 and 
1500, 24.2% earning between 1500 and 2500, 32.1% 
earning between 2500 and 4000 and 11.7% declaring 
to earn more than 4000. The rest of the sample (6.2%) 
did not declare their salary. Missing data consisted of less 
than 3% of total cells. Participants with missing data were 
excluded in the relevant analyses. The survey was pre-
sented as being conducted by an independent research 
institute, not affiliated to any media or political organi-
sation. It consisted of 53 questions divided across four 
categories (social issues, religion, politics and economy). 
The data in the study was collected in accordance with the 
provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration 
of Helsinki and all participants gave verbal consent prior 
to participating.
Measures
Intention to vote ER. As the study was conducted several 
months before the presidential elections, it was not clear 
how it would unfold exactly. Nicolas Sarkozy was finish-
ing his five-year term as a president and was preparing his 
campaign, expecting to be a strong candidate. But,Marine 
Le Pen of the ER, galvanised by a series of electoral suc-
cesses at the local level, was also a serious contender. In 
this context, participants in the survey were requested to 
respond how likely it is that they would vote for Nicolas 
Sarkozy if he was designated for the second round of the 
presidential election against the ER candidate, the FN 
Marine Le Pen on a scale from 1 (very likely) to 4 (very 
unlikely). Thus, higher score indicated higher intention to 
vote for the ER candidate. Details for this and all other 
measures of the present study can be found in the sup-
plementary materials via the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/c3k9y/).
Self-placement on the left-right political con-
tinuum. This was measured simply by the self-report of 
placement on the political continuum from 0 (extreme 
left) to 10 (extreme right). Party preference was also 
noted whereby participants indicated which of the 13 
French political parties they felt the closest to, with a 
full range of parties from the extreme left-wing Nouveau 
Parti Anticapitaliste to the ER party FN. This measure was 
recoded into seven groups whereby similar parties were 
categorised together (1 = extreme left, 2 = left-wing, 3 = 
socialist, 4 = green/eco-friendly, 5 = centre-right, 6 = right-
wing, 7 = ER) for descriptive purposes.
Populist left versus populist right support. On 
the basis of data from Polk et al. (2017, see Figure S1 in 
the supplementary materials), party preference variable 
was further recoded to separate populist left-wing party 
supporters (PG; n = 51) and populist right-wing  supporters 
(FN supporters; n = 40).
SDO. A six-item adaptation of Sidanius and Pratto 
(1999) SDO scale was employed in the present study, a 
French version thoroughly validated in previous research 
(Duarte, Dambrun & Guimond, 2004). Participants 
responded to items such as Some groups are simply infe-
rior to other groups and Group equality should be our 
ideal (reverse-coded) on a scale from 1 (do not agree at all) 
to 4 (completely agree). Higher score indicated higher anti-
egalitarian attitude (D = .68).2
Anti-immigrant prejudice. Participants responded to 
eight items such as Today, there are too many immigrants 
in France and I would have no problem moving into a 
neighbourhood where many immigrants live (reverse-
coded) on a scale from 1 (do not agree at all) to 4 (completely 
agree). The scale was adapted from scales used in past 
research in France and in other countries (Berry & Kalin, 
1995; Dambrun & Guimond, 2001; Zick et al., 2011). Higher 
score indicated higher anti-immigrant prejudice (D = .79).
IRD and GRD. To measure relative deprivation at 
individual and group level, single-item measures from 
Eurobarometer survey (used extensively in previous 
research utilising representative samples for its ease of 
administering; see Pettigrew et al., 2008) were adapted to 
the French context. The main advantage of such a strategy 
is that our results can be directly comparable to that of 
previous research linking relative deprivation with eth-
nic prejudice. To measure IRD, participants were asked If 
you were to compare your personal economic situation in 
comparison to that of most French people, would you say 
your economic situation is? 1 = much better to 5 = much 
worse. To measure GRD, participants responded on the 
same five-point scale to the following item: If you were to 
compare the economic situation of the French people to 
that of immigrants living in France, would you say the eco-
nomic situation of the French people is? A higher score 
in both cases indicated higher feelings of deprivation.
Economic pessimism. For exploratory purposes, three 
items measuring perceptions of economic situation were 
also included. For two of them, participants rated Frances 
general economic situation and personal economic 
situation on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (rather bad), 
whereas the third item related to the perceptions of ones 
future economic prospects with a response on a five-point 
scale (whether it will 1 = strongly improve to 5 = strongly 
degrade). Thus, for all items, a higher score indicated more 
pessimistic economic perception.
Results
The dataset is available via Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/c3k9y/. Mean and descriptive statistics 
broken down by party support are in the supplementary 
materials (Table S1) while zero-order correlations are pre-
sented in Table 1.
Validity of the ER vote measure
As expected, self-placement on the left-right  political 
 continuum was strongly related to party preference, 
r(868) = .62, p < .001. To test the validity of the measure of 
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the intention to vote for Marine Le Pen, we examined the 
relations between this measure and both self-placement 
on the left-right political continuum and party preference. 
In terms of party preference, a one-way ANOVA supported 
the validity of the measure, yielding a large effect size, 
F(6, 839) = 36.05, p < .001, K
p
2 = .21. Participants affili-
ated with the FN display the strongest intention to vote 
for Le Pen (M = 3.55, SD = .85, see supplementary mate-
rials for descriptive statistics for other party groupings). 
This confirms that responses to the measure do indicate 
the relative likelihood of supporting the ER candidate. 
The measure of voting intention was also significantly cor-
related with left-right placement r(901) = .21, p < .001, 
confirming that it relates to the political orientation of 
the respondents. However, the correlation is relatively 
small and negative, meaning that placing oneself further 
on the right was related to less likelihood to vote for Le 
Pen, demonstrating that placing oneself more on left did 
not automatically mean a vote for Sarkozy just because 
he is posited closer to the left than Le Pen. The modest 
size of this correlation indicates that voting for the ER in a 
presidential election is clearly distinct from more general 
ideological preferences.
Validity of the measures of IRD and GRD
Previous research has consistently shown that GRD is a 
better predictor of anti-immigrant prejudice than IRD. If 
our measures are valid, we should find the same. Simple 
correlational analyses indicate that GRD is related with 
IRD, r(984) = .23, p < .001 and that both GRD and IRD 
predict prejudice, r(892) = .25, p < .001,and r(896) = .11, 
p = .001 respectively. Partial correlation analyses indicate 
that GRD remained correlated with prejudice when IRD 
was controlled, r(888) = .23, p < .001 but the reverse was 
not the case, r(888) = .05, p = .11). These findings are in 
line with previous research.
Swaying to the ER
Our central hypothesis was that a vote for Marine Le Pen 
and the ER is motivated by GRD, not IRD. To initially test 
this idea, mean levels of reported GRD were compared 
across political party supporters (see Figure 1). On scale 
from 1 to 5, French citizens reported a mean level of 
GRD of 2.48 (SD = .81). One-way between groups ANOVA 
showed that there was a significant effect of a political 
party on GRD levels, F(6, 873) = 7.91, p < .001, K
p
2 = .05. 
As indicated by the Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests, 
FN supporters were the only group that displayed sig-
nificantly higher levels of GRD in comparison to all other 
groups (all ps < .002, 95% CIs [from .14, 1.07 to .48, 1.31]. 
Thus, the French FN voters felt more collective depriva-
tion than any other political party supporters, providing 
initial support for the importance of GRD. 
Intention to vote ER. To further evaluate our central 
hypothesis, we conducted a multiple regression analysis 
with voting ER intention as the outcome variable. In Step 
1 of the analysis, we entered SDO and anti-immigrant 
prejudice as the predictor variables. While higher SDO was 
associated with higher intention to vote ER, r(866) = .11, 
p = .002, this effect was supressed when anti-immigrant 
prejudice was entered into the model (see Table 2), mean-
ing that the positive relationship between SDO and the ER 
vote was mediated by higher feelings of anti-immigrant 
prejudice.3 This finding replicates the results of Cornelis 
and Van Hiel (2015), providing further evidence for the 
validity of our measure of ER voting.
Next, GRD and IRD were added as predictors of the ER 
voting intention in Step 2. As shown in the first column 
of Table 2 (Vote ER), higher GRD predicted the likelihood 
of voting for the ER candidate, Marine Le Pen, E = .14, 
t = 3.78, p < .001, but not IRD, E = .03, t = .74, p = .463. 
Importantly, this effect of GRD occurred independently of 
participants levels of anti-immigrant prejudice and SDO. 
In other words, the findings indicate that there is a direct 
effect of GRD on voting intentions, which further sup-
ports our hypothesis.
For exploratory purposes, three additional variables, 
namely the perceived economic situation in France, the 
perception of ones own current economic standing, and 
the perception of ones future economic standing, were 
included in Step 3 (see bottom of Table 2). In the ER 
vote model, the effect of GRD as predictor prevailed after 
Table 1: Zero-order correlations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Vote ER  .21*** .18*** .11** .16*** .07* .17*** .22*** .19*** .20***
Left-right  .61*** .25*** .37*** .07* .05 .17*** .13*** .07*
Party pref  .26*** .38*** .09* .07* .11** .13*** .04
SDO  .55*** .16*** .16*** .01 .05 .03
Prejudice  .11** .25*** .05 .08* .16***
IRD  .23*** .11*** .50*** .16***
GRD  .09** .20*** .13***
France ec  .31*** .23***
Personal ec  .18***
Future ec 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p < .001. Ec = economy.
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adding the new variables, E = .11, t = 3.78, p < .001, 
but perceptions that the French and own personal eco-
nomic situation is rather bad predicted more likelihood 
to vote ER, E = .16, t = 4.59, p < .001 and E = .12, t = 2.84, 
p = .005, respectively. Moreover, thinking pessimistically 
about ones future economy (i.e., that it will degrade in 
the next few years) also further predicted a vote for the 
ER candidate, E = .14, t = 4.01, p < .001. Furthermore, in 
Step 3, the role of prejudice in the ER vote diminished 
even more, E = .09, t = 2.14, p = .032, compared to Step 
1. This demonstrates that feelings of being deprived and 
negative perceptions of current and future economy were 
as important, if not more so, than anti-immigrant preju-
dice itself in influencing the ER vote. Overall, the model 
 predicting the ER vote explained 12.6% of the variance 
F(7, 800) = 16.51, p < .001. We conducted relative weight 
analysis using relaimpo R package (Grömping, 2006) to 
compare which of the predictors were statistically the 
most important for voting ER. Anti-immigrant prejudice, 
SDO and GRD were all equally important predictors of ER 
vote (see supplementary materials for R code and output).4
Self-placement on the left-right political contin-
uum. To understand which variables uniquely underpin 
the motivation to vote for the ER, as opposed to being gen-
erally supportive of an extreme-right ideology, the same 
regression analysis model was conducted this time using 
the self-placement on the left-right political continuum 
as the outcome variable. As shown in the second  column 
of Table 2, once SDO and prejudice were controlled for, 
GRD did not predict the left-right political continuum, 
E = .03, t = .76, p = .450. Therefore, GRD uniquely 
 predicted vote for the ER candidate over a mainstream 
right-wing candidate and not the left-right self-placement. 
Figure 1: The effect of party preference on perceptions of GRD. ER voters feel significantly more deprived than 
supporters of other parties. The red line indicates the GRD overall mean score (M = 2.48, SD = .81).
Table 2: Comparison of the stepwise regression model 
predicting the ER vote and the self-placement on the 
left-right political continuum.
Vote ER Left-right
E Adj R2 E Adj R2
Step 1
SDO .02 .03 .07 .13
Prejudice .17*** .32***
Step 2
SDO .01 .05 .08* .15
Prejudice .13** .34***
IRD .03 .13***
GRD .14*** .03
Step 3
SDO .06 .13 .06 .20
Prejudice .09* .36***
IRD .07 .04
GRD .11** .01
France ec .17*** .15***
Personal ec .12** .10*
Future ec .14*** .10**
Note. *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p < .001. ec = economy. 
Multicollinearity was not a problem as all VIF values were 
below 1.7. For the last three predictor variables in Step 3, 
the higher the score the more one endorses pessimistic 
perspectives on the economy. 
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In terms of IRD, it predicted self-placement on left-right 
continuum, E = .13, t = 3.78, p < .001, whereby iden-
tifying as more right-wing was associated with less IRD. 
In sum, Step 2 analyses confirm that GRD and not IRD 
predicts an ER vote.5
Similar to the previous model predicting ER vote, in 
Step 3, we added three additional exploratory  variables. 
Negative perceptions of Frances general economy, 
E = .15, t = 4.57, p < .001, personal economy E = .10, 
t = 2.42, p = .015 and pessimistic thinking about ones 
future economy, E = .10, t = 2.95, p = .003 were all asso-
ciated with lesser likelihood to self-identify as right wing. 
In other words, it was the self-identifying left-wing sup-
porters who were more likely to perceive the economy 
in more negative terms. Overall, the model predicted 
19.6% of the variance, F(7, 823) = 29.59, p < .001. Relative 
importance analysis revealed prejudice to be the strong-
est predictor of self-placement on the left-right political 
continuum (see supplementary materials).
Populism or ER?
Although the data set used in the present study is lim-
ited in terms of participants who typically support PG or 
FN, the two populist parties on the opposite poles of the 
left-right political continuum, we further decided to com-
pare these supporters on the key outcome variables. The 
logic guiding this analysis is that if the outcome variable 
(e.g., GRD or prejudice) is a key element of populism, but 
not of ER, the participants will not significantly differ on 
these dimensions. A series of multiple independent t-tests 
were run to compare mean scores on the key outcome 
variables between PG and FN supporters. There were large 
differences between PG and FN among three variables. FN 
supporters, i.e., the right-wing populists, scored higher 
on anti-immigrant prejudice, SDO and GRD than the left-
wing PG supporters (see Table 3 for statistics). This lends 
further support to the thesis that anti-immigrant preju-
dice, SDO and GRD are predictors of the support for the 
right-wing populists and not populist parties in general. 
Furthermore, there were also medium-to-large differences 
between PG and FN supporters in IRD, with FN scoring 
on average higher than PG supporters. Economic percep-
tions, on the other hand, appear to be less important for 
the right-wing populist voters as FN supporters did not 
differ as much from PG supporters on the perceptions of 
own economical situation or their pessimism towards the 
future of the countrys economy. There was, however, a 
small difference in perceptions of the countrys current 
state of economy, with FN supporters perceiving it slightly 
more negatively than PG supporters. As such, populist 
 voters, independently of their leaning to the left or to the 
right of political spectrum, may share more concerns to do 
with the economy.
Discussion
Why do people vote for the ER candidates? Given the 
increasing electoral success of ER political movements in 
various countries, this question is perhaps more impor-
tant now than ever before. With a representative sample 
of the French population, the present research showed 
that in addition to prejudice and antiegalitarian  attitudes, 
GRD is a significant factor to consider in ER voting. 
Indeed, considering all seven major political party cat-
egories in France, our findings showed first that the FN 
 supporters, that is supporters of the long-standing ER 
party in France, stand out as being more likely to vote for 
Le Pen and reporting higher levels of GRD than supporters 
of any other party. This suggests that GRD and voting for 
the ER are linked. Subsequent analyses strongly confirmed 
that higher GRD predicted higher likelihood of  voting for 
Le Pen over the mainstream right-wing candidate,  Nicolas 
Sarkozy, even when controlling for other powerful pre-
dictors such as anti-immigrant prejudice or SDO. This 
indicates, consistent with past research on GRD in other 
domains (e.g., Abrams & Grant, 2012), that a deep feel-
ing of collective injustice involving a comparison between 
the national ingroup and immigrants is a strong motive 
behind voting for the ER in France. On the other hand, 
however, our analysis showed that there were large differ-
ences between populist left-wing and populist right-wing 
supporters in their mean levels of GRD, suggesting that 
feelings of deprivation may not necessarily underpin pop-
ulist movements as such, as suggested by Marchlewska et 
al. (2018), but rather that it may be unique to those who 
sway towards ER candidates. Together, GRD is a distinct 
predictor of the ER vote alongside anti-immigrant preju-
dice, but it does not predict left-right political placement. 
This highlights the importance of feeling group-level 
 deprivation in pushing voters to consider an ER candidate, 
even if they may not normally identify as right-wing.
Furthermore, in line with Cornelis and Van Hiel (2015), 
we found that SDO indirectly influences vote for the ER. 
While the results of Cornelis and Van Hiel (2015) for 
France were retrospective, based on the party that peo-
ple voted for in the past, the voting intentions in the 
present research were prospective, indicating the prob-
ability of voting for the ER candidate as oppose to the 
outgoing president, Sarkozy. Thus, our findings using the 
novel measure of the ER vote considerably reinforce those 
reported previously. Nevertheless, some caution is needed 
when considering these results because of their correla-
tional nature and because some additional variables that 
Table 3: Mean differences between populist left-wing 
supporters and populist right-wing supporters on key 
study variables.
PG FN t(df) p d
M SD M SD
SDO 1.44 .45 2.17 .67 6.03(84) <.001 1.26
Prejudice 1.84 .72 3.05 .55 8.72(87) <.001 1.86
IRD 2.61 .67 3.05 .68 3.12(89) .002 .66
GRD 2.38 .88 3.20 .91 4.33(88) <.001 .92
France ec 3.76 .79 4.15 .86 2.22(89) .029 .47
Personal ec 2.96 .72 3.28 .91 1.85(89) n.s. .38
Future ec 3.29 1.10 3.48 1.13 .80(87) n.s. .17
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we did not consider could alter the findings. For example, 
we did not measure authoritarian attitudes in the pre-
sent research. Thus, while Cornelis and Van Hiel (2015) 
found that the effect of SDO is independent from authori-
tarianism, we are unable to conclude whether the effects 
observed here would be sustained even after controlling 
for authoritarian attitudes.
Finally, we provided some exploratory evidence that 
negative perceptions related to the personal and coun-
trys economic situation as well as pessimistic outlook 
for the future economy further predicted the ER vote. In 
other words, feeling that things are not going the right 
way economically nor that they will improve in the future 
can motivate voters to turn towards the ER. However, eco-
nomic concerns were also salient among left-wing popu-
list voters meaning that thinking pessimistically about 
the economic situation may be an important factor that 
may persuade citizens to vote for a populist party, inde-
pendently of their left or right leaning. This is in line with 
arguments presented by Inglehart and Norris (2016), who 
advocated for the role of economic insecurity in the rising 
popularity of populist parties. Indeed, economic insecu-
rities may best be characterised by the quadratic model 
whereby these fears are higher among the extreme left 
and the ER identifiers as shown by van Prooijen, Krouwel, 
Boiten and Eendebak (2015). Admittedly, however, this 
line of research requires further investigation to under-
stand whether there are aspects of economic insecurities 
that are specific to left- versus right-wing voters.
The present study also makes a distinct contribution by 
contrasting predictors of general political self-placement 
on the left-right continuum with those of voting inten-
tions in the context of a specific election. While our meas-
ure of the intention to vote for an ER candidate in contrast 
to another popular candidate is not a typically used way 
of tapping into political voting behaviour, we found that it 
is strongly related to party preference, confirming its face 
validity, but that it is more modestly linked to the self-
placement on the left-right political continuum. The data 
showed that the variables underpinning the vote for the 
ER differ from those predicting the self-placement on the 
political spectrum. Indeed, political self-placement and 
the actual vote in the election may not completely cor-
respond; the ER candidates may swing some voters that 
have previously not identified with the ER ideology. This 
raises the critical issue of how ER movements may expand 
their base and eventually seize power through democratic 
means. The current findings highlight that a typical right-
wing self-identifier tends to be more prejudiced against 
immigrants and less likely to think negatively about the 
economy in comparison to a left-wing self-identifier. 
However, these are not necessarily the factors that drive 
the intention to vote for an ER candidate in a national 
election. Marine Le Pen, the ER candidate, was more likely 
than Nicolas Sarkozy, a right-wing candidate, to receive 
support from French people who felt collectively deprived 
in comparison to the immigrants living in France and from 
those who felt negatively about the present and future 
economy, independently of their level of anti-immigrant 
prejudice.
Therefore, the ER parties may expand their base and 
appeal to voters through the political rhetoric utilising 
GRD and by instilling negative perceptions of the econ-
omy, not only by blatant anti-immigrant prejudice. This 
demonstrates why the ER parties may gain some votes 
from people who otherwise would not support them. The 
ER candidates appeal to voters by constructing the reality 
of disadvantage, promising that no citizen will longer feel 
left behind in comparison to other groups such as immi-
grants. While this statement may not be factually correct, 
once the belief is instilled, it encourages people to seek 
out cases whereby a French citizen gets a raw deal in 
comparison to an immigrant to confirm their views (i.e., 
it is prone to the confirmation bias; Nickerson, 1998) and 
eventually becomes sufficient to produce a strong image 
of group deprivation. In that way, ordinary citizens who 
normally are not prejudiced against immigrants can be 
attracted by the ER candidate.
These results provide novel insights into issues that 
should be of concern to social and political psychologists 
such as the question of how to tackle the current trends 
in increasing political polarisation (e.g., see Pew Research, 
2014). As political ideologies become more divisive, there 
is a pressing need to develop ways in which people who 
do not share political views can have a productive discus-
sion regarding the way political systems can serve their 
societies as a whole. The present research demonstrates 
that those inclined to vote for the ER candidates cannot 
be dismissed as doing so just on the grounds of having 
negative attitudes towards immigration. The ER party 
programmes may well attract some individuals who do 
not usually consider themselves as right-wing. Therefore, 
some of the concerns faced by the ER voters can be shared 
with those on the left of the political spectrum who also 
feel more negatively about the countrys economy. This 
offers opportunities for opening a dialogue and decreas-
ing partisanship.
Limitations
Despite several contributions, the present research has 
many limitations. Firstly, the problem with researching 
the ER is that they are sometimes also populist in their 
political agenda (see Polk et al., 2017). This makes it dif-
ficult to distinguish whether the variables investigated 
truly predict ER vote or whether populism predicts a part 
of the variance, as the FNs political rhetoric consists of 
both populist and right-wing elements. Future research 
should devise ways in which these can be distinguished, 
for example, by contrasting these variables to the likeli-
hood to vote for left-wing populist parties.
Secondly, the final model predicting the ER vote 
accounted for 12.6% of the variance, meaning that there 
are still other factors that can contribute to our under-
standing of the vote for the ER candidates. In contrast, 
models explaining the self-placement on the left-right 
political continuum was stronger, with around 20% of the 
variance explained. One of the reasons for that is because 
the vote for Front Nationals Marine Le Pen was compared 
in relation to the outgoing president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who 
is also considered to represent right-of-centre politics. On 
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the one hand, framing the political choice in this man-
ner is useful to identify factors that may be specific to the 
ER. On the other hand, there is a need for more research 
to replicate these findings in context whereby the second 
candidate is more centre or left, something that was not 
addressed in the present study. In addition, we did not 
consider whether participants would vote at all. If given 
a choice of two candidates that do not fit within ones 
political preferences, it is possible that one may abstain 
from voting. Our findings are not able to account for this.
Thirdly, the explanations relating to the importance 
of negative perceptions of the economy need to be fur-
ther tested and developed as the results presented here 
are exploratory. There is a clear scope for political voting 
theory development as these perceptions of the economy 
predicted voting behaviour as well as self-placement 
on the left-right political spectrum when IRD could not 
account for it. Clearly, not only group-level perceptions 
motivate political behaviour, and these should be better 
integrated with the individual-level factors. It is a further 
limitation that we only employ single-item measures to 
capture these economic perceptions. While the same 
shortcoming regarding single items could be argued to 
apply to IRD and GRD items, the main difference is that 
there are both theory and research supporting the validity 
of the measures of relative deprivation. For example, in 
the present study, anti-immigrant prejudice was related to 
GRD, but less so to IRD in line with Pettigrew et al. (2008). 
Nevertheless, further research should improve the meas-
ures by using scales such as those developed by Dambrun, 
Taylor, McDonald, Crush and Méot (2006). Better meas-
urements may also allow for uncovering effects of relative 
gratification, the reverse of relative deprivation, some-
thing that we failed to address in the present research (see 
Anier et al., 2016). Indeed, some research suggests that 
relative gratification also may fuel anti-immigrant preju-
dice (Mols & Jetten, 2016), but it is not yet clear how it 
may affect voting behaviour for the ER candidates. Finally, 
correlational analyses conducted with cross-sectional data 
are not sufficient to establish cause and effect and thus, 
future research should experimentally confirm the role of 
GRD in voting for ER candidates in context of elections or 
employ a longitudinal design.
Conclusion
With the rising popularity of the ER parties across Europe, 
it is necessary to continue to develop models which can 
robustly explain why the ER candidates are so appealing, 
even to those who previously would not consider them-
selves as right-wing. This study is the first to demonstrate 
that, in addition to anti-immigrant prejudice, group feel-
ings of deprivation in comparison to immigrants and 
concerns about the economy can directly motivate the ER 
vote. As such, more research is needed to study the role of 
GRD in explaining why people support the ER.
Notes
 1 Parts of the findings from this survey were also previ-
ously published by Guimond, Streith and Roebroeck 
(2015).
 2 Deleting any single item did not improve the reliabil-
ity of the scale to above 0.7 level, and as this scale was 
validated in previous research, we decided to keep it in 
its six-item form.
 3 To support this, we ran a mediation model which is 
available in the supplementary materials (Figure S2).
 4 We also ran the same model controlling for socio-demo-
graphic variables including gender, age, education and 
salary. Even after controlling for these  variables, the 
effect of GRD on ER vote does not change.
 5 Although some may argue for a theoretical plausibility 
of interaction effects within this model (for example, 
GRD u Prejudice), there were no significant interac-
tions between any predictor variables on the outcome 
variables in Step 2.
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